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Abstract—There exists a widely recognized need to better un-
derstand and manage complex “systems of systems,” ranging from
biology, ecology, and medicine to network-centric technologies.
This is motivating the search for universal laws of highly evolved
systems and driving demand for new mathematics and methods
that are consistent, integrative, and predictive. However, the the-
oretical frameworks available today are not merely fragmented
but sometimes contradictory and incompatible. We argue that
complexity arises in highly evolved biological and technological
systems primarily to provide mechanisms to create robustness.
However, this complexity itself can be a source of new fragility,
leading to “robust yet fragile” tradeoffs in system design. We
focus on the role of robustness and architecture in networked
infrastructures, and we highlight recent advances in the theory
of distributed control driven by network technologies. This view
of complexity in highly organized technological and biological sys-
tems is fundamentally different from the dominant perspective in
the mainstream sciences, which downplays function, constraints,
and tradeoffs, and tends to minimize the role of organization and
design.
Index Terms—Architecture, complexity theory, networks, opti-
mal control, optimization methods, protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
MANY cyber-technical visions convincingly suggest thatnet-centric technology will provide unprecedented lev-
els of capability and efficiency to support the operation and
management of modern society’s most vital functions—ranging
from delivery of economic goods and services, business
processes, global financial markets, education, health care,
defense, and other government services [1]. A fundamental
challenge is to understand and manage the growing complexity
of these systems [2].
Historically, we have done a poor job in managing the fragili-
ties created by our complex networks, from global warming
to ecosystem destruction, global financial crises, etc. In many
cases, past failures are due to fragilities that were direct side
effects of mechanisms that promised to provide great benefits,
including robustness. Thus, “robust yet fragile” (RYF) is an
increasingly central issue in network-centric infrastructures and
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other complex engineering systems, but much of advanced
technology has, if anything, made things worse. Computer-
based simulation and rapid prototyping tools are now broadly
available and powerful enough that it is relatively easy to
demonstrate almost anything, provided that conditions are
made sufficiently idealized. We are much better at designing,
mass-producing, and deploying network-enabled devices than
we are at being able to predict or control their collective be-
havior once deployed in the real world. The result is that, when
things fail, they often do so cryptically and catastrophically.
The growing need to understand and manage complex sys-
tems of systems, ranging from biology to technology, is creating
demand for new mathematics and methods that are consistent
and integrative. Yet, there exist fundamental incompatibilities
in available theories for addressing this challenge. Various
“new sciences” of “complexity” and “networks” dominate the
mainstream sciences [3] but are at best disconnected from
medicine, mathematics, and engineering. Computing, commu-
nication, and control theories and technologies flourish but
remain largely hidden and isolated, even from each other. At
the risk of oversimplifying a complex subject, our aim here is
a minimal but universal taxonomy that cuts across all of these
areas, connecting back to now-classical visions of “organized
complexity” and cybernetics, and, today, to the latest insights
from biology and technology. A theme in this paper is the
central but poorly formalized role that network architecture
plays as “constraints that deconstrain” [4] to organize func-
tional complexity and robustness in highly evolvable systems.
The compatibility regarding these topics within and between
engineering, mathematics, biology, and medicine is striking and
suggestive, and there has been substantial progress bringing
greater rigor and relevance to this broad subject, although much
remains to be done.
We will focus on comparing the architecture of advanced
technologies to biological systems for several reasons. Biolog-
ical metaphors are ubiquitous (e.g., the notion of a “cyber-
physical ecosystem”), and so-called bioinspired systems are
increasingly popular topics of research and development. Yet,
biological systems themselves contain bewildering complexity,
often making accessible only the most superficial connections
to technology, thus compounding errors and confusion. As we
will argue, the connection between advanced technology and
biology is neither superficial nor accidental, and much can
be learned from comparing and contrasting the organizational
principles underlying complex biological and technological
systems. With molecular biology’s description of components
and the growing attention to systems biology, the organizational
principles of biological networks are becoming increasingly
1083-4427/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE
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apparent. Biologists are articulating richly detailed explana-
tions of biological complexity, robustness, and evolvability that
point to universal principles [4].
On the other side, the complexity of advanced technology is
indeed now approaching that of biology. While the components
differ, there is striking convergence at the network level of
architecture and the role of layering, protocols, and feedback
control in structuring complex multiscale modularity. New
theories of the Internet and related networking technologies
have led to the testing and deployment of new protocols for
high-performance networking [5]. These are part of a new
mathematical framework for the study of complex networks
[6] that suggests that this apparent network-level evolutionary
convergence both within and between biology and technology
is not accidental but follows necessarily from the universal
system requirements to be efficient, adaptive, evolvable, and
robust to perturbations in their environment and component
parts.
Various domains of systems engineering and applied mathe-
matics, including computational complexity, numerical analy-
sis, control theory, operations research, etc., have their own
different but surprisingly compatible notions of architecture,
robustness, and complexity despite enormous differences in
components and terminology. Computer science (CS) theorists
have extensively formalized and explored computational com-
plexity, and concepts such as NP hardness and undecidability
have become a universal language, and one we will take for
granted. Less pervasive is the similar formalization that control
theorists have for robustness to component and environment un-
certainty. Particularly surprising is the conceptual consistency
across domains [7]–[9], including biology [4], about issues
that are “architectural,” despite a general lack of formalization,
even within engineering. All of these provide an essential
foundation, and our aim is not for novelty but for consistency
with them and to broaden the concepts and provide context and
connections rather than deepen them. While we do not assume
the reader is versed in all such domain details, we do hope that
it resonates with experts.
II. ROBUSTNESS, DESIGN, AND COMPLEXITY
A key driver of network complexity is the desire for robust-
ness, which is defined as follows.
Definition: A [property] of a [system] is robust if it is
[invariant] with respect to a [set of perturbations].
The use of square brackets emphasizes that formal treat-
ment of robustness requires the specification of the system,
the property, the set of perturbations, and some measure of
invariance (e.g., relative to some norm). Fragility is the op-
posite of robustness (i.e., the lack of invariance) and must
similarly be specified. The [property] usually involves some
notion of system function and/or purpose and thus depends on
domain-specific aspects of the intended behavior, not simply
the structure, of the system of interest. Thus, without specifying
properties and perturbations, to say that a system as whole is
robust or fragile can only mean that the tradeoffs are handled
well or poorly, respectively.
Many important properties of systems can be viewed as
a specific type of robustness. Reliability involves robustness
to component failures. Efficiency is robustness to resource
scarcity. Scalability is robustness to changes to the size and
complexity of the system as a whole. Modularity is robustness
to structured component rearrangements. Evolvability is robust-
ness of lineages to changes on long time scales.
A system can have a property that is robust to one set of
perturbations and yet fragile for [a different property] and/or
[perturbation]. Highly evolved systems, ranging from advanced
technologies to biology, exhibit RYF features, and understand-
ing RYF tradeoffs lies at the heart of the design challenges
for network-centric infrastructures. An example of a possible
RYF tradeoff is that a system with high efficiency (i.e., using
minimal system resources) might be unreliable (i.e., fragile to
component failure) or hard to evolve.
This discussion of robustness assumes that “system,” “prop-
erty,” and “perturbation,” are well defined, and most engineer-
ing disciplines actually do share compatible, if not identical,
notions of these terms, so there is hopefully little risk in
relying on this shared understanding. Much more problematic
is the meaning of “complexity” that is relevant for describing
biological and technological networks. There does not exist
a universally accepted definition of complexity, and consid-
erable confusion within the broader scientific community can
be traced to various usages that are not merely different but
opposite. We discuss these opposing notions in Section IV and,
for now, simply highlight three dimensions of complexity that
are relevant to challenges in system design: large and/or diverse
number of components, the complexity of their interconnec-
tions and interactions, and the complexity of the behaviors that
result. In our view, however, complexity is most succinctly dis-
cussed in terms of functionality and its robustness. Specifically,
we argue that complexity in highly organized systems arises
primarily from design strategies intended to create robustness.
We proceed, in the remainder of this section, with arguments to
support this claim.
A. Organization and Constraints
Complex biological and technological systems share a fea-
ture we call highly organized, in that their components are
arranged in a very specialized structure that enables their
functionality and/or robustness features. Indeed, a feature of
highly organized systems is that even minimal random re-
arrangement of that structure tends to destroy its most salient
features. Then, a key observation in the understanding of highly
organized systems is that their structure is a consequence of
specific constraints that are placed on their functionality and/or
behavior, and this is largely independent of the process by
which this organization arises, whether by design or evolution.
We will describe four kinds of constraints: component, sys-
tem/environment, protocol, and emergent.
Component-Level Constraints. The components that com-
prise any system are typically constrained in terms of what
they can do, even separately. For example, much of mechanics,
electrical circuits, chemical processes, etc., can be described in
terms of relationships such as F = MA and V = IR. These
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constraints are often expressed as differential or algebraic
equations, but they can be more general. The uncertainty of
components often imposes constraints on a complex system that
are as important as the nominal idealized component behavior.
System-Level Constraints. What distinguishes biology and
technology from other types of systems is that there are
complex constraints on the system as a whole that are not
consequences of those on the components, including functional
requirements (i.e., what the system needs to do), as well as the
environmental and operating requirements (e.g., the conditions
under which the system must be able to achieve this function),
and particularly robustness to uncertainty and perturbations
from the environment.
Protocols. Protocols, typically in the form of rules for the
configuration and/or interaction of system components, may
impose additional constraints on the overall system. Although
these additional constraints may reduce the number of possible
system solutions, a “good” set of protocols minimally con-
strains these solutions so as to facilitate a focus on the feasible
and robust solutions.
Emergent Constraints. The interaction of the aforementioned
constraints can imply an additional set. We will (with some
trepidation) refer to as “emergent” those constraints that are
nontrivial consequences of the interaction between the sys-
tem and component-level constraints, and possibly protocols.
Perhaps the most important emergent property of any set of
constraints is whether their intersection is (non)empty, so the-
ory and methods to determine this are central to engineering
specification and design.
Emergence is also associated with unintended consequences
for either good (an emergent benefit) or bad (an emergent
fragility). Emergent benefits in organized systems are suffi-
ciently rare as to be peripheral to this paper, much wishful
thinking notwithstanding, and claims regarding them usually
result from a poor understanding of the other constraints. In
contrast, emergent fragilities, whether unintended or the result
of hard tradeoffs, are dominant problems in complex systems.
Emergent fragilities are also particularly celebrated within the
scientific literature on “disorganized complexity,” where the
(often surprising) collective behavior arising from largely ran-
dom interconnection of typically homogeneous components is
called “emergent” (our focus in Section IV).
B. Dimensions of Design and Organization
Our view is that “organization” is essentially the specialized
structure that allows a system to satisfy the aforementioned
constraints. This notion applies to a wide variety of systems,
and we will use “design” very broadly as both the resulting
system organization and the process leading to it. While greater
formalization is needed, most existing designs result from a mix
of the ad hoc, trial and error, accident, and history, so design,
in this sense, in no way implies a designer but merely some
process, such as Darwinian evolution. Here, reverse engineer-
ing helps to evaluate emergent properties or even to discern
what other constraints have driven an existing design.
Our use of system design is also quite narrow in some
respects. There is a vast space of alternatives in systems
engineering, and we are focusing on an extreme “corner”
of the design space, taking for granted many tradeoffs that
are, in most settings, quite fundamental [7]. The most seri-
ous limitation in our focus here, and one we will return to
briefly at the end, is that it does not explicitly address the
broader human and/or policy issues in complex systems that
can dominate the technology. However, within technology, we
have the following assumptions about the designs of interest
here: 1) They are highly modular (versus integrated); 2) they
use diverse components that are imperfect (versus perfect);
3) they have late (versus early) binding of functionality. This
allows for 4) a diversity of evolvable (versus frozen) capabilities
and behavior; and 5) these systems have fast (versus slow)
pace of change, and adaptive (versus preplanned) behavior via
distributed (versus centralized) control, with extensive use of
feedback. Most systems engineering starts with these (perhaps
more fundamental) design decisions, each of which has its
own associated tradeoffs. We focus on these specific features
because they reflect the choices already made in existing net-
centric technologies and biology, and our aim is to elaborate
on the subsequent issues that arise. We also take for granted
pervasive use of modeling and simulation.
C. Design Strategies for Robustness
Given these restrictions, we briefly review some aspects of
strategies that are most commonly used to build robustness
into system design. The most obvious is to reduce component
uncertainty through “ultraquality” design and manufacturing.
Engineers use digital electronics in part because they have near-
perfect repeatability, with an acceptable overhead in terms of
speed, energy, and precision, allowing systems of enormous
complexity. However, not all components can be ultraquality.
Fortunately, in many cases, the careful organization of unreli-
able components (e.g., in parallel) can increase the aggregate
robustness of the system. For example, building functional
redundancy (i.e., backups) of critical components or subsys-
tems is a popular and well-studied approach to robustness, but
redundancy per se is a limited and blunt tool. More broadly,
there has been for some time a large academic literature on
system reliability (e.g., [10] and [11]). These strategies can
be effective at providing robustness in the face of component
uncertainty, but they do not help to achieve robustness to the
external environment, and the latter drives most of system com-
plexity. To address this, and also provide effective redundancy
management of diverse components, system designers also use
a variety of protocol-based strategies.
System sensors can monitor system performance; detect indi-
vidual component wear, damage, or failure; and/or identify ex-
ternal threats and perturbations to the system. While the ability
to maintain an appropriate level of situational awareness of both
components and environment is critical for complex systems
of all types, such visibility is of limited value if the system
cannot act upon that information, and taking appropriate action
typically drives complexity far more than does sensing. Using
feedback interconnection of sensors and actuators, it is possible
to combine components with very different properties to create
systems with robustness that far exceeds that of components
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separately. For example, it is typically much cheaper to build ul-
traquality sensor and computation components that use energy
efficiently and are extremely robust to noise and environmental
shocks, than it is to build comparably inexpensive actuators,
which often must have large power requirements and hard limits
on achievable accuracy. Feedback control can blend powerful
but sloppy actuators with ultraquality sensors to create systems
that approach the power of the actuators and the ultraquality of
the sensors.
This ability to mix extremely heterogeneous components
gives system designers enormous flexibility in exploiting trade-
offs at the component levels to provide effective tradeoffs at
the system level. Since this strategy is now ubiquitous, most of
the complexity in highly engineered or evolved systems is in
control processes that regulate the internal state and respond to
external changes. For example, in biological regulatory systems
of increasing functional complexity, recent work has shown
that communication and control systems occupy an increasing
fraction of the information and costs of the systems [12].
These automated control systems are the primary source of
RYF in complex systems, since the same systems that provide
robustness under normal operating conditions can yield extreme
fragilities if they fail or are hijacked.
Software bugs have become a dominant source of cost in
many advanced systems. “The Ariane 5 space launch vehicle
was destroyed on its initial flight in a classic common mode
failure. The software on the primary flight control computer
caused the computer to crash shortly after launch. The dual
redundant system then switched to the backup flight control
computer, which had failed as well moments before for exactly
the same reason that the primary computer failed. Ironically,
the software failure was due to code leftover from the Ariane 4
and not actually necessary for the phase of flight in which
it was operating” [7, p.16]. An important point here for net-
centric infrastructures is that the advent of ultraquality digital
hardware merely shifts fragilities from hardware component
failures to software verification, which is driving the continued
development of formal methods in CS [13].
In the end, creating nominal functionality under ideal condi-
tions usually requires only a small fraction of the complexity
required to make that functionality robust not only to scale,
size, interconnection, and/or interaction but also to an enormous
variety of perturbations and variations in the environment and
components. Indeed, the emergence of complexity can often be
seen as a spiral of new challenges and opportunities that organ-
isms and/or technologies exploit, but which also lead to new
fragilities, often from novel perturbations. When successful,
fragilities are met with increasing complexity and robustness,
which, in turn, creates not only new opportunities but also
new fragilities, and so on. Managing or, ideally, preventing this
“RYF complexity spiral” [14] remains a central challenge in
engineering, medicine, and human society.
D. RYF in Practice
Biological and many technological systems are robust and
evolvable in the face of even large changes in environment and
system components, yet they can simultaneously be extremely
fragile to novel perturbations. The ubiquity of this RYF be-
havior is arguably their most crucial emergent property, since
their persistence or evolution by natural selection is actually
a system constraint. Whereas previous work [14], [15] has
detailed key features of RYF in biological and technological
systems, our aim here is to expand on the implications for RYF
as an emergent constraint for design, as well as the challenges
associated with managing RYF tradeoffs. While RYF extremes
seem uniquely modern due to the scale of human technology,
these RYF features of complex systems actually appear in some
form on all time and space scales, from the tiniest microbes
and cellular subsystems up to global ecosystems, and from the
oldest known human social systems to our latest technologies
and their impact on our ecosystems.
New evidence suggests that prokaryote life began deep un-
derground, largely impervious to the late heavy bombardment
(LHB) from 4.5–4 Gyr ago that routinely vaporized surface
land and water (and also wiped out any records of life or of
geological activity, making direct confirmation of these claims
difficult) [16]. When the LHB ended, organisms evolved in-
creased complexity to occupy new ecological niches, but with
fragilities to new perturbations, which drove additional spirals
of complexity, robustness, and new fragility. Most dramatically,
the mass extinctions that punctuate the last 1 Gyr dramatize
RYF tradeoffs between organisms specializing to exploit the
rarity of a particularly perturbation (e.g., large impacts), but
becoming catastrophically fragile and thus extinct when they
finally do occur. The biosphere as a whole remains highly
robust because by most measures—such as biomass, cell count,
or genomic diversity—bacteria still dominate, although this
may be little consolation to humans.
Modern humans have new (emergent) RYF medical prob-
lems, with metabolic syndrome (diabetes, obesity, and inflam-
mation), autoimmune diseases, and cancer being side effects of
biological control and compensatory mechanisms so robust as
to normally go unnoticed. Symptoms such as insulin resistance,
fat accumulation (including elevated intramyocellular triglyc-
eride, or IMTG), inflammation, and proliferative growth are all
also crucial elements of the robust control systems, essential
for successful hunter gatherers, which maintain glucose for
the brain while fueling muscles, even after periods of fasting,
and orchestrate repair and regeneration in response to moderate
and survivable damage and disease [17]. Cancer too involves
the hijacking of development and/or regeneration controls
to create cell-level robustness with emergent organism-level
fragility [18].
RYF complexity is not confined to biology. During the last
century, engineering complexity, in all its aspects, has exploded
wildly, with profound impact that is both positive and nega-
tive. Most obvious is the ubiquity, diversity, and complexity
of digital hardware and associated software. Together with
modern control theory, this enabled an aerospace industry with
routine global and space travel, as well as ballistic missiles.
The Internet has grown from a simple research network to
a critical communication and computing system, enabling an
enormous diversity of applications. Lean, global manufactur-
ing, supply chain management, and sophisticated financial risk
management strategies have made the whole world an efficient
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integrated industrial platform. Yet, almost nothing appears sus-
tainable in the long run, and catastrophic cascading fragilities
seem increasingly commonplace.
Thus, a hallmark of both biology and advanced technologies
is that they exhibit extremes of robustness and fragility, and
highly evolved or well-designed systems at best effectively
manage the resulting tradeoffs. The complexity of technology
is exploding around us but in ways that remain largely hidden.
Modern institutions and technologies facilitate robustness and
accelerate evolution but enable catastrophes on a scale unimag-
inable without them (from cascading failures in networks to
market crashes, war, epidemics, and global warming).
E. RYF in Theory
Despite its importance, the RYF nature of complex systems,
and net-centric infrastructures in particular, remains poorly
understood outside narrow technical domains. Yet, within these
domains are theories of emergent constraints that are arguably
among the most profound insights of the last century and
have become standard material in undergraduate engineering
courses. Examples (often associated with the names of
researchers who were influential in their development) come
from the fields of communications (Shannon’s channel capacity
theorem), control (Bode’s integral formula), and computation
(Turing, Gödel, and undecidability, as well as NP hardness),
plus earlier constraints from thermodynamics (Carnot) and
constraints on energy and entropy. In numerical analysis
and operations research, high computational complexity is
directly connected to problem fragility through the notion of
ill-conditioning. Bode’s integral formula is the most explicitly
RYF as a constraint on the robustness of feedback control, but
Shannon’s channel capacity theorem limits the robustness of
communication.
Turing and Gödel showed that even short theorems may
have no short proofs and also that easily described tasks like
checking whether a computer program will halt (the classical
halting problem) can be undecidable. While two gravitationally
interacting bodies yield simple orbits, Poincare showed that the
motion of even three interacting bodies can be chaotic and hard
to predict in the long term (i.e., fragile to initial conditions).
Indeed, these theories all have explicit RYF hard limits on what
is achievable, either absolute or in expectation, together with
methods to design systems that approach these hard limits.
These emergent constraints are at the heart of their respective
subjects and so important that we sometimes refer to them as
laws. Unfortunately, while the aforementioned theories have
been dramatic success stories individually, they provide a poor
foundation for an integrated theory of robustness. Each depends
on specific and largely orthogonal system, component, and
protocol constraints. However, new unifications are encourag-
ing. As one example from a growing literature, [19] integrates
aspects of information and control theories. Ultimately, a single
theory instead of four separate ones might provide a foundation
for a theory of protocol design, so it is an important goal of
current research.
While there has been some attempt to create a more inte-
grated RYF complexity theory [14], [15], [20]–[26] that con-
tains each of the existing theories as a special case, much
remains to be done. Recent developments in technology, bi-
ology, medicine, and mathematics are fragmented but offer
the promise of a coherent subject. Despite its diversity, this
direction shares the aim to create robust (e.g., evolvable, scal-
able, efficient, etc.) systems, rigorous theories, and efficient
algorithms despite limited resources, uncertain environments
and components, and hard limits on what is achievable. It is
increasingly, if belatedly, focusing on predicting and avoiding
the unintended consequences (a euphemism for ignored fragili-
ties) of technological complexity. The details are unfortunately
beyond the scope of this paper; however, there are common
organizing principles that can aid in a primitive understanding
and can be illustrated with familiar and ubiquitous systems and
their architectures.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Understanding RYF and organization requires understanding
architecture, a term that is widely used, but rarely formalized,
when discussing networks of all kinds. Architectures can be de-
signed, evolved, or both but fundamentally are about handling
or creating the various constraints described earlier to facilitate
“good” solutions among competing tradeoffs. While there does
not yet exist a coherent theory of architecture, there are now
enough examples from biology and advanced technology that
a “comparative physiology” of architecture can illuminate the
fundamental research issues.
We next present some examples from common experience
that are intended to make the notion of RYF complexity,
organization, and architecture more concrete. Most modern
engineering usage of “architecture” focuses on the elements of
structure and organization that are most universal, high level,
and/or persistent. System architecture must facilitate system-
level functionality as well as robustness and evolvability to
uncertainty and change in components, function, and environ-
ment. As with design, architecture includes both systems (or
sets of systems) as artifacts and studies architecture as the
modularity, interfaces, functional decomposition, etc., that form
their actual structure or organization, as well as architecture as
a set of principles used to guide design and construction [7].
A. Case Studies
1) Buildings: If the function of a building is to provide
structure for organizing human activity in a way that is naturally
hierarchical and somewhat scalable—i.e., from furniture to
rooms to buildings to cities—then much of what we require
from buildings (e.g., protection from the environment) is really
robustness. Robust buildings are complex because they are
constructed from a highly structured interconnection of a mix
of heterogeneous components having very different individual
robustness features, and these components are integrated into
a collective whole that draws on specific features of each.
For example, the load-bearing structures might, by themselves,
have almost no other functionality, providing only a scaffolding
on which to hang additional functional elements. Roofs might
bear loads poorly but are waterproof. Insulation materials used
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to prevent heat transfer, or opaque materials for privacy, or
transparent materials to permit light might be neither structural
nor waterproof, depending on their location in the building. To
get real robustness in a building, one must consider tradeoffs in
the use of these components, and complexity comes primarily
from their integration and any control systems for power,
water, waste, and heating and cooling that are used to provide
robustness for these dynamic processes.
In this domain, our thinking about function and robustness is
so intertwined that it is hard to separate them and the aforemen-
tioned discussion may seem strange at first glance. However,
if we imagine what a minimally functional building without
robustness would be like, then providing this basic function
is greatly simplified. For example, in virtual worlds (e.g.,
computer games such as Second Life), the essential features
of building function (the spatial layout that organizes human
activity) and aesthetics (the visual impact of the spatial layout)
can be effectively simulated. Without the robustness needs of
the real world, their structures can be implemented with ex-
tremely simple homogenous virtual materials having no hidden
structure or complexity. More generally, buildings in regions
where robustness to weather is not needed may have greatly
simplified walls and/or roofs. Moreover, the main difference
between a temporary (e.g., modular) building and a permanent
structure is typically not minimal function but robustness (and
aesthetics). The point is that the hidden complexity of a real
robust physical building is vastly greater than what is required
for a minimally functional, perhaps virtual, one.
The classical view of architecture has focused on not only
buildings, their function, and robustness to perturbations from
the environment (including possibly attack) but also aesthetics.
A central debate in architecture has always been the relation-
ship between function, robustness, and aesthetics, with some
arguing that they are inextricably intertwined in ways that are
easily perceived but are hard to articulate [27], [28]. Our aim
is not to resolve these deep debates but to simply use this very
familiar domain to highlight the interplay between robustness
and complexity more generally. Note that engineers also often
reject a design because it is “ugly” or “a kludge,” and many
design philosophies argue for simplicity whenever possible [7],
so the aesthetics of system architecture has broad interest. A
central challenge for a theory of complexity and architecture
is to formalize these intuitive notions that “complexity implies
fragility.”
2) Aerospace Systems: A robust functional aesthetic build-
ing can have an overall structure that remains essentially un-
changed for decades or even centuries and yet provides a
flexible platform for organizing human activities that itself can
change wildly and in ways that are utterly unpredictable in
detail to the original architect. This view of architecture as
“constraints that deconstrain,” as creating platforms that create
robustness and evolvability by accepting certain fixed con-
straints, applies to advanced technologies and biology as well
as to ancient buildings. For example, the technology involved
in the Boeing 777 aircraft has proven to be remarkably robust
in the sense that its design has enjoyed successful operation
amid varying weather and environmental conditions without
a single fatality since its launch over a decade ago. It is, like
buildings, a useful example because it is very familiar and there
are a multitude of books, Web sites, and television shows that
provide accessible expositions of the 777 and its design and
manufacturing process.
In short, aircraft flight depends fundamentally on lift, drag,
propulsion, and control. Lift and drag come primarily from
the shape of the vehicle, and propulsion can be modeled (as
in a wind tunnel) or simulated (in a computer) sufficiently
that this relatively simple representation captures the basics of
aircraft function in ideal conditions. The real complexity lies
in the control of the aircraft, involving sophisticated feedback
systems that make the system far more robust than its (also
fairly reliable) components despite uncertain conditions, rich
feedback diagnostics for preventative maintenance to replace
components before they fail, and judicious use of ultraquality
components.
The 777 is the canonical example of a vehicle platform that
will persist for decades, with electronics and other subsystem
updates but without significant change to the shape of the
vehicle. Moreover, the need to make many copies allows one
to amortize the cost of design, which has famously relied
heavily on extensive modeling and simulation. Another impor-
tant architectural feature of the 777 was the need to design
simultaneously both the vehicle and its manufacturing process,
which is itself a study in organized complexity (and the newer
787 illustrates its RYF features). The 777 is, in turn, part of a
larger air transport system, and system integration is a greater
problem in aerospace—where design is shifting from platforms
to systems and “system of systems”—than for buildings. The
overarching fragilities of our transportation infrastructure can
be glimpsed at this vehicle level and involve more broadly the
unsustainability of burning fossil fuels, of which commercial
aircraft are only a small part.
The recent U.S. missions to Mars provide an equally familiar
set of aerospace systems that had both spectacular successes
and failures. Rovers worked beyond all expectations, yet whole
missions were lost to software failures as apparently trivial as
in the Ariane 5 failure. The components of these systems can
be tested, but the full system operation cannot in a way far
more extreme than the 777, and the complexity challenge is
dominated by creating robustness to uncertainties of the full
operational space environment.
3) Internet: The strengths and weaknesses of modern orga-
nized complexity are exemplified by the Internet architecture,
which will be a central case study in our review of complexity.
The Internet was conceived and created, and it has grown
from a research network to critical infrastructure with much
less theoretical support than comparable aerospace systems.
Recently, a coherent theoretical framework built on optimiza-
tion and control theory has been developed, which retrospec-
tively confirms the intuition of the original engineering (e.g.,
[6], [29], and [30], and the references therein). However, the
path to this theory was not straightforward, and the engineers
clearly led the theorists (this too is typical). On the surface,
the Internet is a communication network linking computers to
function as a distributed operating system. Its hidden core pro-
tocols [Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Pro-
tocol (IP)] involve feedback control systems that dynamically
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manage the network resources, and whose design made little
use of theories from communication and computational com-
plexity, although both inform current research. In fact, clever
engineers ignored theoreticians’ doubts, brilliantly proposed
some basic design principles, and used their intuition and much
tinkering (as always) to build an architecture well beyond any
existing theory. Yet, the Internet’s main fragilities, including the
lack of security and flexibility, remain daunting challenges, and
even more damaging fragilities will arise as the Internet’s role
expands.
As case studies, the 777 and the Internet have important
differences. The 777 and Mars rovers are bounded systems in
the sense that there is a hierarchical “parts list,” and central
control over when and where new parts can be added. In
contrast, the Internet is unbounded in that any device conform-
ing to the standard interfaces and protocols can be connected
and function, which is a crucial design requirement. The 777
also has well-defined interfaces, but bounded so that all the
parts and connections are known before assembly, unlike the
Internet, which is more fundamentally about the interfaces and
protocols than the physical artifact. As a result, the use of a
well-understood mix of modeling and simulation, prototyping,
testing, and experimentation famously enabling the 777 is
relevant but very different for the Internet.
Just the parts list in modern buildings, the 777, or the
Internet cannot be called simple by any measure, yet most of
this complexity remains hidden in normal operation, with the
systems typically far more robust than their components. This
enormous internal heterogeneity and complexity, together with
external functionality and robustness, is the modern hallmark
of organized complexity. However, complexity in technolog-
ical and biological networks is driven not by the number or
diversity per se of the parts themselves but by the control
systems that manage the interaction among components. In
technology, this is evidenced by an explosion in complexity
in computer networks, automobiles, airplanes, supply chains,
package delivery, etc., where emphasis is increasingly placed
on where, when, and how more than who and/or what. Similarly,
in biology, a count of protein-coding genes is only weakly
correlated with organized complexity of organisms [31]. Thus,
organized complexity is not merely about robustness but about
the management of functional robustness and the isolation of
fragility.
B. Protocol-Based Architectures
Protocols are at the heart of architecture, and the parallels
between the Internet and biology are particularly striking, al-
though the level of detail that we can explore here is severely
limited, and the ideas are new and admittedly controversial.
Biologists Gerhart and Kirchner [4] nicely capture the role
of protocols in the phrases “constraints that deconstrain” and
“facilitated variation.” They describe how constraints in the
form of universal shared protocols provide a platform for
diverse functionality and robustness (modularity, efficiency, and
scalability) by facilitating (“deconstraining”) large but func-
tional variation on which selection can act. This controlled
process on the variation side greatly accelerates evolution over
what is possible by the slow accumulation of small changes by
selection acting on random point mutations. Antibiotic resis-
tance by horizontal gene transfer (HGT) is perhaps the most
familiar example, but biologists have now cataloged endless
examples. Although the phrasing differs, this kind of modular-
ity is exactly what engineers would describe as the essence of
architectures [7], and expanding on this observation is a central
theme of this paper. In protocol-based architecture (PBA), the
protocols (rules of interaction that persist) are more fundamen-
tal than the modules (which obey protocols and can change and
diversify). PBAs facilitate coherent and global adaptation to
variations in both components and the environments on a vast
range of time scales despite implementation mechanisms that
are largely decentralized and asynchronous.
1) Protocols and the Internet: The TCP/IP protocol suite
enables adaptation and control on time scales from the sub-
microsecond changes in physical media to the millisecond-
to-second changes in traffic flow, to the daily fluctuations in
user interactions, and to evolving hardware and application
modules over years and decades. This dramatizes how a PBA’s
constraints facilitate both robustness and evolution, and thus,
the nature of the protocol constraints is the essence of archi-
tecture. “Layering” is the most important architectural feature
(although packets are the more obvious) and captures the idea
that each layer in the protocol stack provides services to the
layer above by utilizing and hiding the resources in the layers
below [6], [32]. Reading this paper on a laptop and the Internet
would require application software (e.g., web browser) and
physical layer hardware (superficially a display and keyboard,
but more essentially processing, memory, and interfaces) both
obeying protocols on files and signals. These obviously allow
access to an incredible diversity of software and hardware
resources, but it is the hidden TCP/IP layers that are actually
more fundamental.
The protocol stack is (perhaps unfortunately) called an
“hourglass” because a thin hidden “waist” of universally shared
feedback control (TCP/IP) layers sits between a vast diversity
(e.g., wide range) of visible upper (application software) and
lower (hardware) layers. Roughly, the IP layer controls the
routes for packets on the physical layer below. TCP then uses
this virtualized network resource and controls the rates of
application flows from above and uses acknowledgement-based
retransmission to guarantee delivery if any packets are lost. This
allows “plug and play” between modules that obey the shared
protocols; any set of applications that “talks” TCP can run
transparently and robustly on any set of hardware that “talks”
IP. A crucial point that we will return to later is that such layered
PBAs deliberately do not constrain the topologies within layers,
so there is emphatically no sense in which network connectivity
is an aspect of architecture.
2) Protocols in Biological Networks: The differences be-
tween the Internet and biology are of course more obvious and
profound than the similarities. Briefly, the upper Internet layers
are all software, whereas in biology, all layers involve chem-
istry. The Internet imports electric power and hardware from
manufacturing processes external to it, although the design and
manufacturing of computer hardware, not discussed here, is
also finely layered. In contrast, the bacterial cell must not only
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have the instructions or recipes to make its components, such as
enzymes, but also make and control its energy and redox status,
cell envelope, etc. This massively autocatalytic nature of the
cell has no parallels in the existing Internet, but this will change
in future cyber-physical networks that must have sustainability
as an additional robustness requirement.
A striking similarity between life and advanced technolo-
gies is their reliance on PBAs. Evolvability, from microbes
to ecosystems to IP-based networks, illustrates how dramatic,
novel, dynamic, and distributed changes on all scales of time
and space can also be coherent, responsive, functional, and
adaptive. New genes and pathways, laptops and applications,
and even whole networks can all “plug and play” as long as
they obey the appropriate protocols. Similarly, a PBA in biology
and its control mechanisms facilitate both robustness and evolv-
ability despite massive impinging pressures and variation in
the environment. With the most obvious example involving the
table of codons at the DNA layer, biology’s universally shared
set of protocols is more fundamental and invariant than the
modules whose control and evolution are facilitated by them.
Metabolic and protein–protein interaction networks form
the bacterial cell application layer. These networks are
constrained at the system level by unpredictable intracellular
and extracellular environments and at the component level
from physiochemical laws governing the individual parts (e.g.,
proteins and enzymes) and their reactions (i.e., conservation
laws). Remarkably, despite these huge differences in details,
the main architectural feature of a layered hourglass protocol
stack has striking parallels to the Internet. Briefly, in the
microbial biosphere, DNA is the “lowest” layer with the
genomic information about how to manufacture proteins as
a fundamental resource that must be managed. (This is very
unlike Internet hardware as the resource although, interestingly,
very much like the design of that hardware, a topic that is be-
yond the scope of this paper.) Thus, genes that “talk” the central
transcription and translation protocols (the analog of TCP/IP)
can be expressed on demand by the call, as well as move by
HGT, greatly accelerating evolution in a kind of “bacterial
Internet” [33]. However, also like the technological Internet, the
functionality of new HGT genes and the proteins is enhanced
by having additional shared protocols at the cell’s “application”
layer, such as group transfers and carriers in metabolism, and
conserved residue pairs in signal transduction. Thus, selection
acting at the protocol level could evolve and preserve shared
architecture, essentially “evolving evolvability” [4].
At biology’s application layer, enzymatically catalyzed
reactions are controlled by this richly layered architecture.
Allosteric control and a huge suite of post-translational
modifications of proteins, and the rapid changes in location
of macromolecular modules enable adaptive responses to
environmental signals or alterations on rapid time scales. In
the DNA and RNA layers, transcriptional and translational
controls (and, in eukaryotes, regulation of alternative splicing
and editing) act on somewhat longer time scales. On still longer
time scales within and across generations, the sequences of the
DNA itself can change not only through random mutation but
also through highly structured and evolved mechanisms, such
as HGT, that facilitate the generation of adaptive diversity.
Furthermore, as biologists dig deeper past the superficiality of
sequence data into the complexity of regulation, they unearth
additional layers of control that are fundamentally similar
to those in advanced technologies, with particular interest
recently in RNA-based regulation. There is seemingly no limit
to the ingenuity that biology uses to create additional layers of
sophisticated control [33].
3) RYF in PBAs: Bacterial and Internet PBAs underlie both
their robustness and fragility. PBAs allow typical network
behavior to be fine-tuned through elaborate but hidden control
systems and thus appear boringly robust despite large internal
and external perturbations. PBAs also facilitate evolution, from
microbes to humans and from an academic research network
to a global information infrastructure. As a result of layering
and control, complexity and fragility remain largely hidden,
often revealed only by catastrophic failures and often only
after the system has absorbed multiple insults without apparent
consequences. Large structured rearrangements are tolerated by
control systems that reallocate network resources, easily con-
ferring robustness to outright failures of components and brute
force attacks, with disastrous fragilities to small random or
targeted changes that subtly violate core protocols. The greatest
fragility in PBAs is from parasites and predators, who hijack
and consume universal and standardized interfaces and building
blocks. Hosts and prey, in turn, leverage PBAs to create diverse
immune and protective strategies, and a PBA-enabled arms
race spiral ensues. Antibiotic success and resistance illustrate
both sides of this RYF spiral, as does the enormously complex
challenge of Internet security (and also perhaps the dominant
role that both government and financial institutions play in
modern economies).
From today’s perspective, the Internet architecture was bril-
liant in many respects, such as using packets and layering,
but it had little theoretical support for ongoing design, which
has primarily been tinkering and intuition with considerable
experimentation via simulation or prototype. This is much like
evolution but without the bacterial biosphere’s relatively unlim-
ited time and scope (billions of years and 1030 cells) to explore
design alternatives. It has aspects of human evolution where
our historical legacy from fish to primates endures. In both
cases, the core protocols have been such amazing platforms
for innovation that changing them is either truly impossible or
appears nearly so, but a fundamental reassessment might benefit
the health of both humans and their technology [8]. For sure, as
technological visions increasingly emphasize ubiquitous con-
trol, communications, and computing—with systems requiring
a high degree of autonomy, adaptation, evolvability, scalability,
and verifiability—a more predictive, rigorous, coherent, and
reasonably complete mathematical theory underpinning Inter-
net technology and its future architecture is needed [6].
4) Designing Protocols: Designing architectures is
fundamentally about the choices associated with all four types
of constraints (systems level, component level, emergent,
and protocols) that give rise to organized system structure.
This constraint-based view of architecture naturally invites
optimization as an important tool for the analysis and design
of network protocols. Recent analysis and design of IPs
has benefited tremendously from a developing mathematical
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framework that views various protocol layers as carrying
out asynchronous distributed computation over the network
to optimize a global objective function subject to resource
constraints in the network [6]. Under this view, different layers
iterate on different subsets of the decision variables using local
information to achieve individual optimality. Taken together,
these local algorithms attempt to achieve a global objective.
Such a framework exposes the interconnections between
protocol layers as different ways to modularize and distribute
an otherwise centralized function, formalizes the common
practice of breaking down the design of a complex system
into simpler modules, and provides a top–down approach
to both the systematic design of layers and the tradeoffs
between competing design objectives. The application of this
framework to reverse engineering in biology is promising but
so far relatively less developed [21], [22], [34]–[36].
IV. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF COMPLEXITY
Organized complexity, as described in this paper, is so funda-
mental and consistent in the way that engineers, biologists, and
physicians see the world that it is sometimes hard to imagine
a different view. However, in fact, much of the mainstream
effort within the physical sciences on the study of complexity
and most of the popularizations over the last several decades
have followed a view that is not merely contradictory but pro-
foundly incompatible. This alternate view downplays function,
organization, systems constraints, and design, focusing instead
on emergent features of disorganized systems, particularly their
fragilities. The result is a disconnect that is far more severe than
the technical fragmentation within engineering, and it remains
a persistent source of confusion. In this section, we put this
disconnect in an historical context, develop a broader taxonomy
for complexity that includes both threads, and highlight some
recent research that underscores the difference using illustrative
examples from the Internet and biology. We expect that this
section will have the most divergent responses from readers,
an issue that we will address throughout.
A. Historical Perspective
The use of the term “organized complexity” can be traced
to Warren Weaver [37], [38], who, in 1948, contrasted three
classes of problems facing science: problems of simplicity
versus disorganized complexity versus organized complexity.
Simplicity: Weaver briefly mentions simple problems as
those involving a small number of variables, and he attributes
much progress in the physical sciences and technology ad-
vances to successful application of the scientific method to
simple problems. With modern computation, the number of
variables per se has receded in importance, but Weaver’s other
distinctions remain relevant. We can update Weaver by saying
that a system is simple if it has “simple questions” (i.e., models,
theorems, experiments, and computations) to which there are
“robust answers.” By simple questions, we mean only that the
questions of interest can be posed using models that are readily
manageable and easy to describe, that theorem statements are
short, and that experiments are elegant, are easily described, and
require minimal interpretation. By robust answers, we mean
that theorems have simple counterexamples or short proofs,
algorithms scale, and simulations and experiments are repro-
ducible with predictable results.
There are many classical examples of such simplicity: the
pendulum as a simple harmonic oscillator; simple RLC circuits;
the interaction of two bodies via gravity; and simple Boolean
logic circuits as implemented in much digital hardware. Many
questions regarding their behavior are simple, as are the an-
swers. Most early educational exposure to mathematics in-
volves simple theorems with short proofs, and this is always the
goal of even the most advanced mathematics. What we view as
simple necessarily evolves over time, and modern technology
has greatly expanded what we might think of as simple. The
triumph of reductionist science has been to reduce the apparent
complexity of the world directly to an underlying simplicity.
Physics has always epitomized this approach, and recently,
molecular biology has successfully mimicked physics.
Disorganized Complexity: Weaver also describes an
important development in scientific thinking that was taking
hold in the early 1900s. Rather than pursuing simplicity with a
few variables, “imaginative minds went to the other extreme,”
focusing on problems with asymptotically infinite dimensions
and developing “powerful techniques of probability theory
and of statistical mechanics to deal with what may be called
problems of disorganized complexity.” In Weaver’s canonical
example of billiards, classical dynamics accurately predict
trajectories of a small number of balls on a table, and expert
players can robustly control these trajectories by keeping them
relatively simple. As the number of interacting balls increases,
robust predictions become intractable, either computationally
or for players. However, as the size of the table and the
number of balls become very large, specific problems involving
ensemble average properties actually become easier and more
robust, and statistical methods apply. In essence, what Weaver
called disorganized complexity was ultimately a way to extend
the “simple” to large ensembles and, in his thinking, was not
really about complexity at all.
Organized Complexity: Weaver used the term “disorga-
nized” here to emphasize that “the methods of statistical me-
chanics are valid only when the [billiard] balls are distributed,
in their positions and motions, in a helter-skelter, i.e., a disorga-
nized, way. For example, the statistical methods would not ap-
ply if someone were to arrange the balls” and their movements
in some highly organized manner. While Weaver acknowledges
the prevalence of disorganized complexity in many important
systems, he notes the importance of an intermediate class that
“does not depend primarily on the fact that the number of
variables is moderate. . .. The really important characteristic
of the problems of this middle region, which science has yet
little explored or conquered, lies in the fact that these problems,
as contrasted with disorganized situations with which statistics
can cope, show the essential feature of organization. In fact,
one can refer to this group of problems as those of organized
complexity.”
Weaver’s motivating examples are primarily those of bio-
logical systems, and he points hopefully to early computers
and operations research as potential tools to address organized
848 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 40, NO. 4, JULY 2010
TABLE I
TWO DIMENSIONS OF COMPLEXITY
complexity. Weaver’s vision was shared by many of his contem-
poraries, and diverse authors used his paper as a departure point.
Organized complexity was formalized by Norbert Wiener in his
development of cybernetics as a common theoretical core to the
integrated study of technological and biological systems [39].
Jane Jacobs in 1961 [40] argues that cities should be “identified,
understood, and treated as problems of organized complexity”
but that “. . . the theorists of conventional modern city planning
have consistently mistaken cities as problems of simplicity and
of disorganized complexity, and have tried to analyze and treat
them thus. . .. These misapplications stand in our way; they
have to be hauled out in the light, recognized as inapplicable
strategies of thought, and discarded.” Thus, by 1960, it was
clear to many engineers, mathematicians, biologists, and social
scientists (at least) that organization was more than the statistics
of random ensembles.
B. Unified Taxonomy
Table I extends Weaver’s taxonomy minimally to include two
recent developments: 1) the explosion in organized complexity
and modern technology and 2) the rich subject, primarily within
physics, that grew out of chaos, fractals, and criticality and
has been dominating the study of disorganized complexity
since 1960. One dimension in Table I is the complexity of the
system descriptions and/or models, and the other is behaviors
in response to perturbations in descriptions, components, or the
environment (robust versus fragile). Simple models can have a
few components or an asymptotically large number of randomly
interacting homogeneous components, while complex models
may have a large number of heterogeneous components.
Even simple models (and theorems) can exhibit extreme
fragility and unpredictability (and long proofs). Organized
complexity produced modern network technology by managing
the resulting fragility–complexity spiral. Yet, it is possible for
systems to have gratuitous fragility unrelated to any tradeoffs.
This is very unlike RYF organization, where fragilities are the
side effects of mechanisms for robustness, and the tradeoff
between the two is the focus of design or evolution. Such
gratuitous fragility is celebrated in modern treatments of dis-
organized complexity, which are more commonly known as
the “new sciences of complex networks” (NSCN) or some
variant. Although organized complexity pervades mainstream
science in the form of modern technology, the NSCN view of
disorganized complexity dominates modern scientific thinking
about complexity in a way that would likely have surprised and
concerned thinkers like Weaver, Wiener, and Jacobs.
NSCN offers an integrated, unified, and popular view of
“simple yet fragile” complexity and has yielded a vast literature
on power laws, fractals, self-similarity, and self-organization.
Among the most popular of these theories, self-organized crit-
icality (SOC) [41], edge-of-chaos (EOC) [42], and scale-free
networks (SFN) [43] are different in detail but share fundamen-
tal features, which are summarized in Table II. For example,
their analysis focuses on random ensembles (of lattices or
cellular automata, Boolean networks, and graphs, respectively)
that are minimally tuned via a single parameter (an order
or “friction” parameter, connectivity or correlation structure,
and preferential attachment, respectively) to particular fragile
configurations (a critical phase transition, a bifurcation point,
or a power-law node degree distribution). The differences in
details are indeed minor compared with their shared similarities
and the extreme differences with organized complexity.
A major source of confusion is that NSCN and organized
complexity typically use different and often opposite meanings
for the same words, such as architecture, robustness, fragility,
networks, and “not random” (even different notions of “proof”
and evidence). Consider the start of a recent review article in
NSCN [44]: ‘By definition, complex networks are networks
with more complex architectures than classical random graphs
with their “simple” Poissonian distributions of connections.
The great majority of real-world networks. . . are complex ones.
The complex organization of these nets typically implies a
skewed distribution of connections. . ..’ Note here that “archi-
tecture” and “organization” have nothing to do with system
function, protocols, or any aspect of design but simply mean
“graph topology.”
Power laws (or scaling distributions) have been another
source of confusion because of their opposite interpretations
and incompatible statistical treatment. In the NSCN and mod-
ern physics literature, power laws are viewed as “signatures”
of specific mechanisms, namely, critical phase transitions [41]
and preferential growth [43], because these mechanisms can
generate power laws in simple models of disorganized systems.
Adding to the confusion is that common NSCN statistical
techniques, such as the use of binned frequency plots, make
it easy to “discover” power laws where none exists or to
mischaracterize their most salient features (see [45, Sec. 2.1]).
However, a broader view of high variability and power laws
reveals a long and rich history outside physics [46]–[48].
Interest in preferential growth models (called the Matthew
effect, or “rich get richer”) actually peaked in the 1950s in a
fierce debate regarding technical details (see [49] and [50]),
and studying them became almost passé by 1960 due in part
to earlier results on the strong statistical invariance properties
of power laws. Specifically, the central limit theorem without
a finite-variance assumption shows that power laws are the
natural “null hypothesis” for processes involving high variance,
just as Gaussians serve as a null hypothesis for low-variance
processes. This view suggests that the mere presence of power
laws alone implies nothing about an underlying mechanism,
nor does it require special explanation beyond high variability
(see modern reviews [51], [52] and related discussions [45],
[48], [53]).
At issue is how to explain the ubiquity of power laws in real-
world data from linguistics, economics, biology, the Internet,
disaster statistics, etc. For researchers trained to look at the
world through the eyes of disorganized complexity, criticality
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CONTRASTING VIEWS OF NSCN AND ORGANIZED COMPLEXITY
and preferential attachment provide simple explanations. How-
ever, from the perspective of organized complexity, it is not
power laws per se that are important but the presence of under-
lying high variability. High variability can arise naturally as the
result of highly organized/optimized tradeoffs in the design of a
variety of systems [54]–[57], and thus, for high-technology and
biological systems, power laws serve as the natural statistical
null hypotheses for the high variability in RYF systems [15].
C. Case Studies: Opposite Views of the Internet and Biology
NSCN offers a coherent and consistent world view about
what is essential and universal in complex networks, and their
model abstractions have an appealing simplicity, which is itself
always an attractive goal. However, on almost every conceiv-
able dimension, NSCN and organized views of complexity
are not merely different but opposite. This can be seen in the
books on EOC, SOC, and SFN, in the science literature that
preceded them, in broader popularizations (e.g., [58]), and,
most saliently, in the familiar case studies of the Internet and
biology. Thus, it is important to be clear exactly what are the
consequences of these differences and what is crucial versus
incidental. Power laws feature prominently in much of the
NSCN, along with claims that their presence implies certain
underlying mechanisms. As noted previously, this claim is false
and can lead to a host of methodological errors, but power laws
are not the crux of the issue. The crucial distinction is really
the NSCN emphasis on emergent fragilities in disorganized
systems, as captured by the other dimensions in Table II.
The Internet provides a clear illustration of the differences
between the NSCN view of architecture as graph topology
versus the organized view of architecture as layering and pro-
tocols. SFN models of other networks, while different in detail,
share all of these features, as do earlier SOC and EOC models
(e.g., for the canonical SOC example of wildfires, see [57]). In
particular, many SFN (and EOC and SOC) models analogous
to the Internet have been made for a variety of biological
networks. The flaws in this work are similarly the result of
modeling biological structure as a disorganized system, but
their clarification is technically more difficult (see [35] and
[59]–[61]), so we focus on the Internet.
Four of the six most cited papers in ISI Web of Science
searched with topics “Internet” and “network∗” focus primarily
on SFNs [62]–[65]. What launched the SFN genre (grabbing the
cover of Nature as well as popular news outlets as a previously
overlooked “Achilles heel of the Internet”) is a scale-free model
of the Internet router layer physical topology [65], in which
the following hold: 1) The primitives are random router and
web graphs without system-level function other than graph
connectivity; 2) architecture simply means graph topology;
and 3) SFN components are homogeneous, functionless links,
and nodes (for routers but also web pages and autonomous
systems). There is no mention of the layering, protocols (e.g.,
no TCP/IP), or extreme diversity and heterogeneity in link and
router bandwidths and geography, web and application page
size, content, and functionality (both in space and over time as
applications and hardware change) that personify the organized
Internet.
In SFNs, “not random” means probabilistic but power law
distributed, achieved as an emergent property via minimal
tuning of an order parameter, i.e., in this case, a linear term that
determines preferential attachment. SFNs have minimal uncer-
tainty, only that nodes and links can be removed or rewired.
By definition, SFNs are robust to random degree-preserving
rewirings, are minimally perturbed by random link or node
removal or addition, yet are extremely fragile to attacks on
high-degree central hubs. One important feature from organized
complexity that the SFN router model introduced into NSCN is
the idea of a worst case attack rather than merely random node
removal. Otherwise, there is no sense in which “not random” in
NSCN usage suggests highly organized, designed, evolved, or
structured.
In organized complexity, SFNs provide simple models in
many domains, including paper citation graphs (ironically, in-
cluding the scale-free literature itself), bacterial clonal lineages
in culture, and city sizes and many other social and economic
systems (all well known for decades even before 1960). Since
the Internet facilitates enormous diversity at the application
layer, good SFN models should be found there as well, but they
are very poor models of the Internet itself and most biology.
An essential feature of the Internet’s true architecture is that it
deliberately places no constraints on its physical or application
connectivity. Thus, the connectivity could be anything in princi-
ple, but because of high variability in connectivity, link speeds,
file sizes, etc., power laws do exist everywhere in the Internet
(and in biology). However, this connectivity can be difficult to
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measure and is full of complexities symptomatic of its highly
organized structure, and both have been the source of errors
when studied through the lens of disorganized complexity [66].
When viewed as organized complexity, the structure of the
router-level Internet is easily understood as highly constrained
at both the system and component levels [25], [45], [67]. Most
simply, routers have hard limits on the rate of processing data
packets, creating a design tradeoff—router connectivity can
range between a small number of high-bandwidth connections
and a large number of low-bandwidth connections. It is impos-
sible for a router to handle a large number of high-bandwidth
connections (although “large” and “high” are relative and al-
ways growing with technology). As a result, any high-degree
“hubs” (if they exist at all and regardless of whether their
degrees followed a power law) would directly constrain the
achievable network performance. In SFN models, these hubs
are centrally located, and in random graphs, this is where they
must be with high probability [45]. Such central hubs would be
such a severe performance bottleneck that their loss would be
a secondary concern. While TCP/IP can, in principle, run on
any router topology, an SFN would have performance so poor
and costs so high as to be prohibitive in practice. In reality, any
high-degree hubs in the router-level Internet would necessarily
be located at the periphery of the network, where they would
aggregate low-bandwidth users and connect them to the high-
speed core. The loss of such edge hubs could mean local
disruptions for disconnected users, but the core of the network
would remain unaffected. Whether edge hubs create power laws
in the real Internet is doubtful but also irrelevant [66].
Irreducible Complexity: The “irreducibly complex” com-
bines the complicated descriptions of organized complexity
with excessive fragility. It is associated with another con-
temporary of Weaver, namely, Rube Goldberg, whose famous
cartoons depict “comically involved complicated invention[s],
laboriously contrived to perform a simple operation” [68],
which are themselves far too fragile to persist in the real world
but have still become important metaphors. Engineers use Rube
Goldberg comparisons as an insult similar to “kludge,” yet
engineering students engage in fierce competitions to build their
own Rube Goldberg-like contraptions. These are fun, amusing,
and even educational because they share features of engineered
organization, such as many heterogeneous parts, complex in-
terconnection, high variability and dynamics, and sophisticated
control, plus ingenuity, workmanship, and patience. Yet, the
outcome is so unlike real engineering: trivial functionality, with
hyperfragility to almost everything.
There are other engineering circumstances, such as in se-
curity and, particularly, cryptography, where the intractability
and fragility of irreducible complexity (although the term is
not used here) are actually valuable resources. This notion of
“fragility by design” is a rich subject but unfortunately beyond
the scope of this paper. As for biology, some properties of par-
ticular individuals that seem gratuitously fragile may be “frozen
accidents” that have temporarily avoided selective elimination,
and these may be intrinsically unpredictable. Biology may have
parallels with cryptography, but as in engineering, most fragili-
ties are the inevitable consequences of robustness tradeoffs.
Indeed, the extraordinary robustness and evolvability of the
biosphere as a whole suggest that biology is rarely irreducibly
complex. In general, the extreme and cryptic fragility of irre-
ducibly complex systems, whether in biology or technology,
suggests not intelligent design but the lack of it.
V. IMPLICATIONS, INCLUDING POLICY
This attempt to contrast and ultimately reconcile these very
different views of complexity would be a mere academic exer-
cise were it not for the prevalence of complexity in our most
pressing challenges where technology and policy intersect.
Scientific illiteracy of the public and of policy makers can
make it easy for ideologues to zero in on areas of complexity,
where explanations are difficult to understand, and muddy
the water. However, this is also exactly what happens within
science itself around “complexity.” That the broader scientific
community can diverge so thoroughly on a topic as relatively
straightforward as the Internet is discouraging for reaching
the needed consensus on much thornier challenges such as
sustainable infrastructure, medicine and health care, ecosystem
degradation, global warming, and even evolution.
Thus, there is an urgent need both technically and edu-
cationally for a more integrated and accessible treatment of
complex systems, and there is some hope. Existing organized
theories of a system-level architecture for complex networks
are nascent, but it is clear that design of architectures is a topic
of increasing importance. As sketched in this paper, progress is
being made in our understanding of complex system analysis
and design, but considerable work remains. We need more
accessible explanations of technical organization and tradeoffs,
as well as a greater understanding of how the principles of
organized complexity can be used to provide guarantees on the
performance and reliability of the system as a whole. We cannot
afford to wait to see what emerges from the ongoing integration
of the Internet and other critical infrastructures, nor can we
trust the validation of such systems to heuristics and simulation.
Worse, the existing economic incentives in technology markets,
which disproportionately reward time-to-market over quality
and thus lead to a “hack and ship” mentality, are a disaster for
net-centric infrastructures.
Fortunately, there is much recent work, compatible with the
highly organized view of complexity taken here, that focuses
on large institutions and their human actors, policies, and
economics. It goes by various names combining resilience,
security, and/or safety with engineering and/or economics (and
which we will denote collectively as RSE) [9]. RSE recognizes
that policy can often trump technology and, more importantly
and broadly, that technological solutions are inadequate and
incomplete if the human actors do not have their incentives
aligned with the technology. A particularly consistent RSE
theme cautions that “human error,” particularly when persis-
tent, is often actually a symptom of system design problems.
RSE urges looking past the proximal cause of any one observ-
able failure to see whether it has merely triggered a fragility
inherent to the system, one that should really be addressed
with a system solution. RSE emphasizes that any new theory of
network architecture must include a realistic treatment of policy
and incentives.
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In the meantime, NSCN remains a growing activity in acad-
emia and funding agencies, and there remains considerable
hope (even among folks who concede that the field has not
lived up to its hype) in the promise of fundamental and practical
discoveries. Presumably, this is a symptom of a real need for
better methods to deal with complexity and the frustration that
everyone has with the obscure and RYF nature of technol-
ogy. Unfortunately, the organized and disorganized views of
complexity continue to be so incompatible that there is no
real dialogue between them, and thus, it is difficult to build
on the accessibility and successful popularizations of NSCN.
Advocates of NSCN are quick to admit that their models are
simple and thus have flaws (as do all models), but argue that
this is only because (e.g., like thermodynamics) they avoid
nonessential details. Yet, as we have argued, features of orga-
nization are essential details. Moreover, equally simple models
of router and network constraints can more accurately describe
realistic topologies and also be extended to describe the far
more important elements of layering and protocols.
To Internet technologists and operators, what is truly beyond
doubt is that the SFN models and the real Internet are so
obviously and extremely incompatible [25], [45], [67] that
further discussion would seem unnecessary, and we should
move on. Yet, within NSCN, this consensus among experts
is completely ignored, and the Internet remains the canonical
success story where established tools from physics for studying
power laws and disorganized systems uncovered a hidden but
catastrophic flaw in the Internet (first overlooked and then
denied by the experts). This is underscored in a recent special
issue in the journal Science: “Today, the scale-free nature of
networks of key scientific interest, from protein interactions to
social networks and from the network of interlinked documents
that make up the WWW to the interconnected hardware behind
the Internet, has been established beyond doubt” [69]. Here,
the RSE emphasis on systemic flaws in human systems raises
provocative questions about the tendency for too many scien-
tists (and not just the public and policy makers) to prefer simple
myths over complex but inconvenient truths.
In the real world of network-centric infrastructures, the gra-
tuitous (and presumably avoidable) fragilities highlighted in
either NSCN or irreducible complexity would be disastrous far
beyond the intrinsic RYF nature of highly organized systems.
Yet, there is little consensus on even the most basic strategies to
avoid this in real-world networks. In the worst case, we might
build increasingly complex and incomprehensible systems that
will eventually fail completely yet cryptically, and recent eco-
logical disasters and financial crises are not encouraging. At
best, we need to better manage the tradeoff between functional
robustness and emergent fragility so that we can appropriately
balance the benefits of increased efficiency and convenience
with the potential for large-scale disruption. We may not be able
to overcome intrinsically RYF aspects of the Internet and other
net-centric infrastructures, but we should be able to minimize
the potential risk of catastrophic failure.
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